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Committee Influence Over 
Controversial Policy: The Reproductive 
Policy Case 
Noelle H .  Norton 
Debates about legislative committee power have been fueled 
with empirical examples depending too much on distributive policies. I 
argue that answers to questiom about the nature of committee influence 
can be enhanced by focusing on nondistributive policies that evoke 
broad national attention. For years scholars have not systematically 
tested committee influence over nondistributive policy because they 
hate asserted that these policies are designed by the parent chamber or 
party. B y  using a methodology that traces the origin of legislation and 
identifies key policy activists, I demonstrate that committee influence 
over nondistributive controversial policy is more pronounced than 
others have maintained. 
By all accounts, the first session of the 104th Congress (1995-96) looked 
as if it would hasten the long and slow demise of the congressional committees' 
power over public policy design. Reports of the maverick freshman class 
demanding floor votes on contentious issues (Koszczuk, 1996) and of the 
Republican leadership submerging committee goals to party priorities (Koszczuk, 
1995; Sinclair, 1995) were commonplace in the House of Representatives during 
1995. By the end of the year, it appeared that House committees retained little of 
their past dominance over the important policy issues of our day. Evidence 
presented in this paper will temper these observations. Here, I argue that 
committee members were able to influence the design of nondistributive 
controversial policy that evoked the concerns of a broad national public through 
the 104th Congress. This research will add to a growing body of scholarship that 
seeks to identify more fully the nature of committee influence over public policy. 
Over the past decade legislative scholars have used empirical and 
theoretical research to document the erosion of committee power in relation to the 
parent chamber (Krehbiel, 1987, 1991; Smith, 1989) or in relation to the party 
(Cox & McCubbins, 1993; Kiewiet & McCubbins, 1991). These studies of 
committee performance in the 1970s and 1980s were used to develop two new 
models of the committee system-a chamber-dominated model and a party- 
dominated model. Both models have been presented in the literature as competing 
replacements for the traditional model of the strong autonomous committee 
(Wilson, 1885). Some of the more recent legislative scholarship, however, 
criticizes these models for being static or too narrow and suggests that a 
conditional model will provide a more accurate description of the committee 
system's influence over public policy. In the new conditional models, the nature 
of committee power depends upon the salience of the policy issue under 
consideration: Committees retain influence over low-salience distributive policy 
and relinquish influence to other institutional actors over high-salience policies of 
all types (Hall & Grofman, 1990; Maltzman, 1995, 1997; Maltzman & Smith, 
1994; Rohde, 1994). 
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The conditional model of committee power is very attractive. We are not 
forced to make a choice about whether the party or the parent chamber controls 
policymaking for legislation handled in Congress. A conditional explanation 
indicates that committees still matter (Fenno, 1973), while at the same time it 
suggests that there are limits to committee influence in specific instances 
(Maltzman, 1995, 1997). We expect to see the committee pushed aside when 
issues are highly contentious, while we expect the participation of party leadership 
or motivated rank-and-file members to intensify for important legislation. This 
pattern is exactly what we thought we saw in the 104th Congress: a weak 
committee and a centralized party on all major pieces of legislation. 
The recent conditional models actually are articulating earlier claims made 
about issue salience and committee power. For years political scientists have 
asserted that the policy type can condition the power of the committee (Fenno, 
1966; Lowi, 1964). Most have agreed that when issues are publicly salient, when 
members are polarized ideologically, and when individual committee members 
display intense feelings about an issue, the committees generally are constrained 
by the parent chamber and/or the party (Dyson & Soule, 1970; Hinckley, 1975; 
Kingdon, 1989; Price, 1978; Smith & Deering, 1990). I argue, however, that the 
ability of committees to influence the scope of controversial policies may have 
been underestimated by most legislative scholars. 
Noticeably missing from the literature is an analysis of the committee 
influence on the floor when there are controversial, ideological, or moral conflicts 
at stake. Debates about whether legislative committee power has eroded in 
relation to the power of the parent chamber have been fueled almost exclusively 
with empirical examples based on pork-barrel, or distributive, policies (e.g., 
Arnold, 1979; Hall, 1996; Hall & Grofman, 1990; Krehbiel, 1991; Niskanen, 
197 1). For years scholars of congressional committees have foregone systematic 
empirical analysis of committee power over nondistributive controversial policy 
because of an implicit assumption that these kinds of policies are framed by those 
who participate in the parent chamber and not by those who participate in 
committees of jurisdiction. 
A systematic longitudinal examination of congressional handling of 
nondistributive controversial national policies will allow us tp critique these 
assumptions. Using a carefully selected sample of controversial reproductive 
policies considered in the House of Representatives between 1969 and 1996- 
including abortion, family planning, contraception, pregnancy, sterilization, and 
surrogacy legislation-I demonstrate that committee influence over policy choice 
can extend to an influence over nondistributive controversial legislation. Results 
of this research corroborate and enhance studies like Hall’s (1996), which indicate 
that only a few intensely interested committee members participate in policy 
design. 
The Reproductive Policy Example 
Reproductive policy legislation provides a good example of an 
ideologically charged nondistributive policy that has been handled in Congress 
with increasing frequency over the past three decades. Like gun control, school 
prayer, and gay rights legislation, reproductive policy legislation represents a 
nondistributive policy that evokes the passion of individual representatives.l 
Since the environmental movement declared population growth a national threat in 
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the late 1960s and since the Supreme Court declared that a right to privacy 
extended to a woman’s right to have an abortion in Roe v. Wade (410 U.S. 113, 
1973), members of Congress have been forced to grapple with this whole set of 
complex and contentious issues whether they liked it or not. 
Political practitioners and academics alike identify this policy type as 
contentious enough to affect the sound functioning of our democratic institutions. 
The reproductive rights debates fought on the floor of the House of 
Representatives have been characterized as the most volatile and emotionally 
charged that members have faced in the modem Congress. One senator described 
these policies “as the most divisive basic issue I have run across in my experience. 
It far outweighs, in terms of its supporters and its opponents, gun registration, 
fluoridation, or any other issue of temporary or permanent significance.”* The 
antagonistic floor debates and highly publicized floor amendments over 
reproductive policies actually have helped to develop arguments that policymaking 
is no longer controlled by the once-powerful congressional standing committees. 
Several legislative scholars have argued that it is the abortion and family planning 
issues that encouraged participation by congressional members on the House floor, 
where visibility is paramount, instead of in committee, where participation is 
more difficult to trace (e.g., Bach & Smith, 1988; Davidson, 1983; Steiner, 
The reproductive policy sample selected to analyze committee influence 
over a controversial nondistributive policy includes 138 bills identified as those 
containing significant pieces of reproductive policy legislation that originated in 
the House of Representatives between 1969 and 1996. Bills used in the sample 
were identified as those containing some form of reproductive policy by 
Congressional Quarterly Almanac (1969-96) and four national interest groups 
dedicated to reproductive policy issues.) Use of all five sources assures us that the 
sample represents a comprehensive, if not a complete, list of reproductive policy 
legislation given serious consideration by a committee or on the floor for almost 
three decades. Since this research evaluates committee handling of these policies 
at various stages of the formal legislative process, the sample includes only 
legislation that moved beyond assignment to committee, to at least committee 
hearings or a full committee mark-up meeting. Approximately 66% of the 
reproductive policies in the sample were considered to be riders or amendments to 
other legislation, and 34% were considered to be conventional legislation or full 
bills, like family planning authorization bills and late-term abortion bills. 
Recent empirical research helps to verify the level of controversy 
surrounding reproductive policy legislation and to assure us that the sample 
selected for this study indeed is an example of a controversial nondistributive 
policy (Norton, 1997). This research indicates that 88% of the bills in this 
sample can be rated as being highly controversial by traditional indicators of 
legislative controversy. Congressional scholars have considered bills to be highly 
salient if they meet some of the following criteria: (a) the legislation included a 
Congressional Quarterly “Key Vote” (Shepsle & Weingast, 1987; Smith, 1989); 
(b) the legislation was decided with a close vote of less than a 60% to 40% margin 
(Smith, 1989; Weingast, 1992); (c) the legislation was included in the scorecards 
of national interest groups (Kingdon, 1989; Mayhew, 1991); (d) the legislation 
was part of an omnibus or continuing resolution (Smith, 1989); or (e) the 
legislation itself was covered frequently by the national press (Kingdon, 1989; 
Mayhew, 1991). According to these criteria, reproductive policy is considered to 
be highly controversial in the halls of Congress. 
1981). 
205 
Policy Studies Journal, 27:2 
Studying Reproductive Policymaking in Congress 
Given the level of public controversy surrounding reproductive 
policymaking, how can we show that committees retain influence over this kind 
of policy and that activity on the House floor does not necessarily indicate a 
decline in committee influence? A cursory analysis of reproductive policy floor 
amending over the years might indicate that committees do not have power over 
this kind of policy. A more thorough analysis of the precise origins of 
reproductive policy legislation and identification of a small group of policy 
activists, however, will show that very little of this policy actually originates or 
is permanently altered on the House floor. Instead, most reproductive policy 
originates inside committee or subcommittee and if altered on the floor at all it is 
by subcommittee members with specific reproductive policy jurisdiction. 
Analysis of  Floor Trends 
In his analysis of the “revolution” in the House, Smith (1989, p. 16) 
argues that the “explosion of floor amendments is the core feature of changing 
House politics since the 1950s.” A superficial analysis of reproductive policy 
floor amending over the years similarly suggests that these policies fit a pattern of 
increased floor activity and provide a perfect example of the breakdown of the 
traditional committee structure in the House. By collecting and analyzing data 
from the sample on reproductive policy floor amending between 1969 and 1996, a 
trend toward more public floor activity on this legislation is a~parent.~ 
Analysis of floor amendment data provides three indicators that 
committee members do not control the design of reproductive policies under their 
jurisdiction: (a) the numbers of reproductive floor amendments have increased 
between 1969 and 1996; (b) bill managers responsible for reproductive policy 
legislation are more likely to lose than win when defending their position on the 
floor; and (c) there are more noncommittee members than committee members 
offering reproductive policy amendments. 
Specifically, the data show that there is a flurry of reproductive policy 
amending on the House floor every time the abortion issue captures national 
attention, which might indicate that this legislation is drafted on the floor. After 
the announcement of Supreme Court decisions in Roe v. Wade (410 U.S. 113, 
1973) and Webster v. Reproductive Health Services (492 U S .  490, 1989), 
reproductive policy floor amending activity increased substantially from previous 
years. For example, between 1985 and 1988 there were only 19 contentious 
reproductive policy amendments offered on the House floor, but between 1988 and 
1992 there were 27 of these floor amendments, indicating that reproductive policy 
may be sensitive to national events. Because floor activity increases when these 
policies become publicly salient, committees with jurisdiction may have little 
control over their own agendas. 
Further, bill managers from the committee or subcommittee with 
reproductive policy jurisdiction have not always been successful in fending off 
unwanted reproductive policy amendments offered on the House floor. In fact, 
44% of the reproductive policy amendments in the sample that were opposed by 
the bill manager succeeded, suggesting that committee leaders have less control 
over these kinds of issues. Research on distributive legislation by Bach (1986) 
shows that bill managers typically succeed on 84% of the bills and amendments 
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they supported on the floor. If bill managers dealing with reproductive policies 
generally are not as successful in protecting their bills, we might conclude that 
reproductive policy is crafted on the floor more often than inside the committee 
moms. 
Finally, a majority of reproductive policy floor amendments typically 
have been made by representatives who do not hold seats on the committees with 
jurisdiction over that policy. In three decades, noncommittee members have 
offered 55% of all reproductive policy actions in the sample. Moreover, there is 
evidence that noncommittee member floor amendments have been more successful 
than have committee and subcommittee member amendments, indicating that 
committee members with jurisdiction are not always shown respect on the floor 
when reproductive policy questions are under consideration. 
These analyses of floor amendment activity, bill manager success rates, 
and amendment authorship all point to a lack of committee influence over crafting 
reproductive policy. Here we have found a publicly salient policy in which 
individual members of Congress have displayed intense personal feelings. These 
feelings have been exhibited in increased floor activity, decreased instances of bill 
manager success, and increased amending activity by noncommittee members or 
outsiders. Most research on floor and committee behavior would conclude at this 
point, with a statement that this kind of policy has contributed to the breakdown 
of the committee system. 
A Comprehensive Look at Committee Activity 
Floor amendment data provide only a snapshot of reproductive 
policymaking. Although the cursory observations made above are not inaccurate, 
they are incomplete. A more thorough investigation provides a more complete 
picture by first locating the origins of key policy provisions and then noting the 
specific identities of the network of members of Congress involved in activity on 
the floor. By identifying policy origins and the names of the floor activists, we 
will see that reproductive policy generally is written by one type of interested 
member who is affiliated with a subcommittee that has specific jurisdiction over 
this policy. 
Analysis of Policy Origins 
In his description of the revolution in floor amending activity, Smith 
(1989, p. 168) also warned about hasty conclusions that committee power was 
declining because he had not conducted a “detailed analysis of legislative outcomes 
and the origins of key provisions.” A full  assessment of the policy origins of 
reproductive policy suggests that Smith was perceptive in issuing this warning. 
We need to ask where final versions of national reproductive policy originate 
before making any conclusions. Is the final design hammered out by committee 
members or is it put together on the floor by noncommittee members as the 
previous evidence suggests? We can consider that the floor holds influence in the 
following instances: if the floor majority fails to pass committee legislation; if 
the floor majority is successful in amending legislation written by committee 
members; or if the floor majority can succeed in denying or altering the conference 
committee’s recommendations. Is this the case for reproductive policy? Are 
policies designed in committee doomed to be rewritten or fail on the floor? 
The data collected from the sample for this part of the investigation use 
the whole policy as the unit of analysis. The data analyzed in the previous section 
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used only the floor amendment to evaluate activity on the floor, while the next 
part of the analysis uses the whole policy to evaluate activity at all points in the 
legislative process. Now the bills with floor amendments, as well as the bills that 
did not face amendment or the bills that never even left committee can be included 
in the analysis. Important legislation that committees either obstructed from 
consideration on the floor or that was ushered through the floor debate without 
amendment should be counted. This kind of legislation is overlooked when 
research uses the amendment rather than the policy as the unit of analysis. 
Several steps were taken to identify and collect data on the origin of the 
final version of each piece of reproductive policy legislation in the sample. First, 
summaries of the progression of the legislation through the House are provided by 
the Congressional Quarterly Almanac (1969-96). These summaries gave the 
initial indication of where each provision originated. Second, the progression of 
legislation reported by Congressional Quarterly Almanac and Congressional 
Quarterly Weekly Report was verified with the following set of primary sources: 
minutes from full committee mark-up meetings; the Committee on Rules’ 
Legislative Calendars; floor debates from the Congressional Record; conference 
reports; debates over conference reports from the Congressional Record; and 
informal interviews with committee staff. 
When decisions on policy content are recorded at each point of the 
policymaking process, it is possible to pinpoint where an idea or provision started 
and garnered support. As the origin and outcome of a reproductive policy was 
identified, I assigned a code indicating which panel was responsible for a particular 
policy approach. The outcomes of both successful and unsuccessful policies were 
coded as originating in one of the three following locations: (a) the 
subcommittee/committee, (b) the floor, or (c) the conference committee. Policies 
ultimately amended or killed on the House floor were coded as indicators of floor 
influence, policies originating in committee were coded as indicators of committee 
influence, and policies that originated in committee but ultimately were derailed 
outside the House by the Senate or vetoed by the president also were coded as 
indicators of committee influence because they remained intact until they left 
House control. The coding scheme assures that policies originating or failing on 
the House floor are coded as clear indicators of the floor majority’s power.5 (See 
endnote 4 for details on coding policy origins.) 
Despite the evidence of increased activity on the floor, this analysis 
shows that only a small percentage of reproductive policies designed in 
subcommittee either fail or are rewritten on the floor and remain unchanged by the 
conference committee. Table 1 indicates that only 15.2% (21 out of 138) of all 
House reproductive policy legislation originated from the floor, while a total of 
84.7% (1 17 out of 138) originated from subcommittee and committee activity. 
Furthermore, Table 1 shows that, of the 15.2% influenced by the floor in more 
than two decades, only 10.9% (15 out of 138) actually became law. Included in 
the 84.7% influenced by committees are policies that originated in the following 
House locations: 31.9% of the legislation was crafted by subcommittees and 
committees and successfully passed in the form originally designed; 13.0% of the 
legislation was passed into law as committee-preferred compromises designed by a 
conference committee comprised almost entirely of subcommittee members; 
15.2% of the legislation was retained by the committees and never reached the 
House floor; another 17.4% of the legislation, although originally designed by 
subcommittees and committees, was vetoed by the President; and 7.2% of the 
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Table 1 
Origin of Reproductive Policy Legislation, 1969-96 
Origin Total % (n) 
House Floor Design: 15.2% (21) 
Successful policy (passed) 
designed or killed on floor 10.9% 
Unsuccessful policy (not passed) 
designed on floor, 
died after passage 4.3% (6) 





Design: 84.7% (117) 
Successful policy (passed) 
Subcommittee/committee 
design 3 1.9% (44) 
Conference committee 
design 13.0% (18) 
Unsuccessful policy (not passed) 
Stalled in committee 15.2% (21) 
Died after floor passage 7.2% (10) 







w: Congressional Record,  1969-96; Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1969-94; 
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 1995. 1996; Committee meeting minutes from 
Appropriations. Commerce, Judiciary. and Economic and Educational Opportunities Committees, 
1975-96; Conference Committee reports, 1973-96. 
U: Number of bills in parentheses (n = 138). 
legislation also originally designed by the subcommittees and committees was 
killed in the Senate. 
The origin of the reproductive policies considered in the 104th Congress 
is emphasized in Table 1. None of the reproductive policies considered in 1995 or 
1996 was altered significantly from the version designed by the subcommittee of 
jurisdiction. Given the reports of rampant floor amending over the abortion and 
family planning legislation during the first session, it is surprising to find that the 
committee-designed policies remained intact while under House control. In reality, 
a majority of the reproductive policy bills passed by the House in the 104th 
Congress were passed with subcommittee-designed provisions only to be stalled in 
the Senate or vetoed by the president. Table 1 indicates that 41.7% of the 
reproductive policies designed in subcommittee during the 104th Congress were 
stalled in the Senate, 25% were vetoed by President Clinton, and 33% were 
redesigned by the conference committee before final passage of the legislation. 
Although little of the reproductive policy legislation was passed in the form 
desired by the House, this should not detract from the fact that committee 
members ultimately designed bills that were passed on the floor. 
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Despite the example of the 104th Congress, committees have been 
responsible for a substantial majority of the successful reproductive policies 
enacted into law over the past three decades. Table 1 also shows that a total of 77 
of the reproductive policies in the sample were passed successfully: only 15 
pieces of legislation were designed on the House floor, while 62 were designed by 
the committee. In other words, the reproductive policies passed into law were 
crafted on the House floor 19% (15 out of 77) of the time, while 81% (62 out of 
77) of the reproductive policies passed into law were crafted by the committee. 
These results suggest that committees and subcommittees have had substantial 
influence in turning reproductive policy ideas into reproductive policy law. 
Specific examples of committee involvement in the original design and 
support of reproductive policies abound. The Hyde Amendment, prohibiting the 
use of federal Medicaid funds for abortion except when the mother’s life was 
endangered, is perhaps the most controversial and important piece of federal 
legislative reproductive policy. Many might argue that the Hyde Amendment 
provides a perfect example of the power of the parent chamber. Representative 
Henry Hyde offered an amendment to the Labor, Health, Education and Welfare 
(LHEW) Appropriations spending bill for fiscal year 1977. Hyde was not a 
member of the Appropriations Committee, and his amendment, which was offered 
on the floor, passed and has been attached to all LHEW bills (Labor Health, 
Human Services, and Education [LHHSE] after 1980) in one version or another 
since 1976. 
The story that is told rarely, however, is that the LHHSE subcommittee 
chairs and their Appropriations Committee chairs always have supported and 
actually fought for the language initially written by Representative Hyde. After 
the first amendment in 1976, the Hyde Amendment language has been initiated, 
supported, and encouraged in the Appropriations subcommittee. Review of full 
committee mark-up minutes and debate in the Congressional Record indicates that 
the two subcommittee leaders in charge of this legislation for over 20 years, 
Daniel Flood (D-PA) and William Natcher (D-KY), supported the restrictive 
abortion language because of personal conviction. Furthermore, few realize that 
the actual language used for the Hyde Amendment was drafted by an LHHSE 
subcommittee member (Packwood, 1992, p. 637). Congressmember Silvio Conte 
(R-MA) offered the language we are all familiar with during the conference 
committee meeting. The House ultimately accepted Conte’s language, not 
Hyde’s. 
The Hyde Amendment is not the only example of subcommittee and 
committee success in ultimately achieving important policy goals. First, Julian 
Dixon, chair of the Appropriations subcommittee on the District of Columbia, 
has been described as a bill manager who was “rolled” on the floor year after year 
when trying to retain District funds for local Medicaid abortions. In fact, when 
measuring bill manager success rates on the floor, Dixon is counted as one of the 
frequently unsuccessful bill managers. The amendment data, however, do not 
show that Dixon always has been able to win back his version of the abortion 
language in the conference committee meetings after the floor proceedings are long 
over. He lost his policy position for only 1 year, in 1988, after a protracted battle 
with the Senate conferees.’ In 1989, his subcommittee language prevailed 
through both the committee mark-up meeting and through a floor battle-only to 
be vetoed by President Bush.* Second, major pieces of reproductive policy 
legislation have passed through the House floor and the conference committee 
without significant alteration of the committee’s original design. Notable national 
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legislation like the 1978 Pregnancy Sex Discrimination Amendments to Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1991, and 
the Late-Term Abortion Procedure Ban of 1995 all passed the House floor without 
being altered. 
By providing an analysis of legislative outcomes and the origins of key 
provisions, the evidence indicates that a majority of these controversial policies are 
drafted at steps in the process where committees retain some influence. Searching 
for policy origins by tracing all reproductive policies from start to finish shows us 
that floor amending does not necessarily affect policy outcomes. 
Committee Member Activity Revisited 
Review of the origins of reproductive policy legislation above suggests 
that committee members do exert their influence over this type of legislation. 
How do we reconcile these observations with the conflicting floor amendment data 
indicating that noncommittee members increasingly are involved in reproductive 
policy floor activity? A careful reanalysis of the floor amendment data shows that 
only a small number of "interested" noncommittee members are responsible for a 
majority of all amendment activity. 
First, reanalysis of the amendment data shows that floor actions by 
committee and subcommittee members with reproductive policy jurisdiction 
actually have been increasing over the past three decades. Although overall totals 
indicate that more noncommittee members have offered floor amendments, 
longitudinal analysis shows that floor amendments increasingly have been offered 
by committee and subcommittee members. Table 2 shows that only 8% of all 
floor actions were proposed by committee members between 1973 and 1976 (the 
93rd and 94th Congresses), but that more than 55% of all floor actions were made 
by committee members between 1989 and 1992 (the lOlst and 102nd Congresses). 
The number of committee-sponsored floor actions declined slightly, to 48% in the 
104th Congress, but an even closer inspection of the data shows that there is an 
explanation for this finding. 
Second, reanalysis of the floor amendment data also shows that a large 
percentage of the noncommittee activists come from other House subcommittees 
with specific jurisdiction over reproductive policies. As I collected data on the 
author of each floor action, I kept a record indicating whether a noncommittee 
author happened to serve on another subcommittee with relevant policy 
jurisdiction over similar kinds of reproductive policies. For example, Henry Hyde 
had been a member of the Judiciary Committee subcommittee on Civil and 
Constitutional Rights, where he worked diligently on reproductive policy issues 
for years. Yet, Hyde also worked closely with the Appropriations Committee 
chairs to attach the spending limitation restricting federal Medicaid funds for 
abortions. Hyde got credit as a noncommittee member for offering the 
amendments, but we overlook the fact that it was the Appropriation Committee 
chairs who allowed Hyde to offer the amendments in the first place because of his 
recorded interest in this policy area. In 1993, Hyde, faced with passionate oratory 
from a group of women members of Congress, was able to offer his amendment 
only because of the direct support of the Appropriations Committee Chair, 
William Natcher. Working together, Natcher and Hyde were able to outmaneuver 
abortion rights supporters using the committee prerogatives available only to 
Nat~her.~ 
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Table 2 
Authors of Reproductive Policy Floor Action, 1973-96 
Congresses Committeea Jurisdictionb Rank-and-FileC 
95th and 96th (1977-80) 45.0% (18) 20.0% (8( 35.0% (14) 
97th and 98th (1981-84) 35.7% (5) 14.3% (2) 50.0% (7) 
99th and 100th (1985-88) 57.9% (1 1) 15.8% (3) 26.3% (5) 
lOlst and 102nd (1989-92) 55.6% (15) 37.0% (10) 7.4% (2) 
104th (1995-96) 47.4% (9) 36.8% (7) 15.8% (3) 
93rd and 94th (1973-76) 8.3% (1) 58.3% (7) 33.3% (4) 
sQIL[LEe: Congressional Record, 1969-96. 
w: 
between 1969 and 1973. 
Number of actions in parentheses (n = 131). No amendments were made on policies passed 
Includes actions taken by standing committee members. 
Includes actions taken by members of subcommittees with specific reproductive policy 
Includes actions by noncommittee members and members without reproductive policy 
jurisdiction. 
jurisdiction on another committee. 
This evidence suggests that a substantial number of the noncommittee 
activists, like Hyde, serve on other subcommittees with important or relevant 
jurisdiction over reproductive policy. This reanalysis of committee membership 
shows that for the three-decade period of floor activity, approximately 45% of the 
floor action has been by committee and subcommittee members, 28% by members 
with “other subcommittee” jurisdiction over reproductive policy, and only 27% 
from the rank-and-file membership not associated with reproductive policy 
committee jurisdictions. Thus, 73% of all floor action comes from authors who 
work on reproductive policy issues for other committees. Table 2 emphasizes this 
trend toward a decline of activity by rank-and-file membership over the years and 
the increase in activity by committee members and members from subcommittees 
with parallel jurisdiction. By the 102nd Congress (1989-92) only 7% of the 
action on the floor was sponsored by rank-and-file members, and by the 104th 
Congress the participation of rank-and-file members remained minimal, at 16%. 
Finally, the closer inspection of amendment data also shows that a 
substantial number of the floor amendments actually were sponsored by a very 
small group of activists who had an ideological interest in reproductive policy 
legislation. When the specific identities of the floor activists are noted, we 
discover that the network is limited to a few participants. Even the rank-and-file 
members, who do not sit on any committees or Subcommittees with reproductive 
policy jurisdiction, comprise a narrow group specifically interested in reproductive 
issues. 
A substantial proportion of all amendments were offered by seven 
individuals. Chris Smith (R-NJ), Robert Dornan (R-CA), Henry Hyde (R-IL), 
William Dannemeyer (R-CA), John Ashbrook (R-OH), Robert Bauman (R-MD), 
and Mark Siljander (R-MI) were solely responsible for 43% of all reproductive 
policy amending. Furthermore, 66% of all amending activity conducted by rank- 
and-file members was done by four individuals who did not have any reproductive 
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policy jurisdiction at the time they offered an amendment: Chris Smith, Robert 
Doman, Robert Bauman, and Mark Siljander. By the 104th Congress, the rank- 
and-file noncommittee activists still could be identified by name-Smith and 
Dornan continued to be the primary activists in 1995 and 1996. 
A notable change in identity of floor activists, however, did take place in 
the 104th Congress: 37% (7 out of 19) of all committee and noncommittee 
reproductive policy amendments were offered by women in the 104th Congress. 
Prior to 1995, women members of Congress had offered only three amendments 
during the entire period that reproductive policy was considered in Congress 
(Norton, 1995). More noteworthy, however, is that a majority of the amendments 
in the 104th Congress were offered by women who sat either on a committee or 
subcommittee with reproductive policy jurisdiction. Specifically, 7 1 % (5 out of 
7) of the amendments were offered by women who held some relevant form of 
reproductive policy committee jurisdiction. For example, Rosa DeLauro (D-CN), 
Patricia Schroeder (D-CO), Nita Lowey (D-NY), and Jan Meyers (R-KS) all used 
their institutional position to offer reproductive policy amendments. 
These findings imply that committee members can anticipate and plan for 
who will participate in amendment activity on the floor. A majority of the 
amendments are offered from one of the following sources: (a) subcommittee 
members with jurisdiction, (b) subcommittee members with relevant jurisdiction 
on another committee, or (c) a small select group of noncommittee members who 
can be identified by name or gender. Although committees face more challenges 
today, this evidence suggests that they are able to help guide the design of 
legislation for even the most controversial policy. 
Conclusions 
The analysis of committee influence over reproductive policy made 
between 1969 and 1996 allows us to take a broader look at committees when 
controversial nondistributive policies are at stake. Contrary to recent observations 
of the 104th Congress, the evidence indicates that committee members not only 
influence the design of distributive legislation, but that they influence a 
controversial nondisuibutive national policy as well. Analysis of policy origins 
and legislative outcomes shows that few successful reproductive policies are drafted 
on the House floor (15 out of 138) and that a few highly motivated subcommittee 
members have the desire and the institutional position to influence the scope of 
national reproductive policy. My results are similar to those arrived at by Hall 
(1987, 1996) about the strong motivations of a small group of committee 
members to craft public policy, with one notable addition-I find that an “inner 
circle” of committee activists is involved in designing a nondistributive 
controversial or ideological policy, too. 
Legislative scholars who contend that issues evoking broad public 
attention are more likely to be hammered out in open debate on the floor need to 
reassess their conclusions. Here we have an example of a nondistributive policy 
that has not been shaped on the House floor, contrary to the perception of both 
political practitioners and academics. There is no question that reproductive policy 
amendments were debated endlessly on the house floor, but an alternative analysis 
shows that much of this amending did not shape reproductive policy legislation. 
Also, legislative scholars who make conclusions by looking at one part of the 
policymaking process might want to reassess the methods they use. Here we have 
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an example of a method that uncovers evidence of committee influence, contrary to 
findings made with a method that analyzes only floor amendment data. The 
analysis of legislative origins and identification of actual policy activists provides 
a more complete picture of the entire policymaking process. 
Still, results of this research are not meant to suggest that the 
autonomous committee model would provide a more accurate picture of committee 
performance. Nor do they suggest that a chamber-dominated model or party- 
dominated model would provide a better explanation. Instead, the results of this 
research suggest that we continue to search for a conditional model that accurately 
depicts the nature of the committee system. 
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